One of the most debated issues in international finance is the meaning of the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds.
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I. The Contemporary Drama
Contracts among sophisticated players, students in a basic contract law class are taught, are carefully vetted by the parties and their lawyers and the terms and What one does not expect to see in the world of sophisticated high finance are contract terms that parties across an entire industry use and have been using for over a hundred years yet neither party seems to understand. One would think, after all, that after repeated use for over a century, contract terms would become better and better understood.
That then brings us to the story of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments. This little clause, generally no more than a couple of lines long and sporting a bit of latin finery, has become perhaps the most controversial and well known clause in international finance, while at the same time also being the least understood. 3 The clause has been around in sovereign debt bond contracts for almost two centuries, we suspect. Through the 1800s and early 1900s its use gradually increased, but it was still only in a minority of all sovereign bonds. 4 In the modern era, however, as its understanding has diminished, its popularity has increased. Today, it is ubiquitous; there is almost no sovereign bond that doesn't announce in its first few pages that investors are protected by a pari passu clause. provides an illustration. The pari passu clause shows up on the glossy cover page of the prospectus, in the second paragraph -that is, the paragraph after the first one that described the interest rate and maturity of the bond.
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As best we can tell from the writings of scholars in the area (the academic writing on sovereign bonds contracts is sparse), no one paid attention to this clause for much of its history. That is perhaps understandable because the clause did not seem to make much sense for much of its history, or at least its modern history. The typical formulation of the clause in the early era of the modern sovereign bond market, the mid 1980s and early 1990s, would go something along the following lines:
The bonds will at all times rank pari passu with all other unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Republic.
In some bonds though, the additional word "payment" would creep in to modify the concept of ranking equally. The use of the payment concept has become and increasingly popular formulation of the clause over past decade or so. That additional language often looks something like this:
The bonds will rank equally in right of payment with all of the Republic's other External Indebtedness.
The notion of ranking equally (pari passu is latin for in equal step) is one from bankruptcy. When a company goes bankrupt and its assets are liquidated, the creditors who rank equally get proportional shares. The complication with sovereigns though is that they cannot and do not go bankrupt. They can run out of money, but they cannot be taken over and liquidated by their creditors. After all, their primary asset is the willingness of their citizens to pay taxes, and citizens cannot be seized and then divided proportionally among creditors (at least not in the modern era).
One of us has spent a considerable amount of time asking lawyers in the sovereign debt field why they continue to use a clause that few of them seem to understand well. Lawyers provide a range of responses, ranging from "the clause is not completely useless; it protects against a sovereign passing a law that grants priority status to some other creditors over you" to "it is there because it has always been there; no one really thinks about it". 5 As one prominent commentator in the field has written:
[I]t can be said that the pari passu clause mistakenly migrated from secured private lending to unsecured sovereign lending. Once rooted in unsecured sovereign lending instruments it faced provisions like the ones in Spain or the Philippines and become a 'must have' provision in this type of debt instrument. 6 Then, pari passu clauses stayed in place out of fear of earmarking revenues and the risk that the sovereign preferred one group of creditors over another. These fears, however, were tackled by an expanded negative pledge clause and the Libra and Allied cases. Therefore, if a proper due diligence was conducted there was no need to have a pari passu clause except in exceptional circumstances like the ones in Spain or the Philippines. 7 The foregoing was perhaps a perfectly good answer until about a decade ago when a case called Elliott v. Peru, was decided by a commercial court in Brussels. 8 There, Elliott, a U.S. hedge fund, was holding Peruvian sovereign debt that the country was unwilling to pay because Elliott, unlike the majority of other creditors, had refused to restructure its debt. Elliott was instead demanding that it be paid the full contractual obligation. Peru, while stiffing Elliott, was planning to pay its other creditors who had agreed to take write downs and these payments were going to be transferred via Euroclear in Brussels.
Elliott then seized upon the pari passu clause to argue to the court in Brussels that (a) it knew precisely what the clause meant and (b) it meant that those funds in Euroclear could not be used to favor one set of creditors (the restructured debt holders) over another (namely Elliott). The Brussels court agreed with Elliot's argument and issued an injunction against Euroclear. Peru did not want to default on its restructured bonds, and settled with Elliott for the full contractual amount. 9 It was, to put it mildly, a monumental event in the history of sovereign debt because a private creditor has succeeded in using the courts to force a sovereign to pay on its contract obligations.
A discerning reader at this point will probably ask the "how?" question. If the Republic of Peru was refusing to pays its debts to Elliott anyway, who cares whether Elliott has some additional right to proportional payment. After all, the sovereign is refusing to pay, regardless of the rights that the creditor holds. The answer -and this was the magic in the Elliott strategy -was that a pari passu clause is not just a contract tying the debtor and creditor together. Under the Elliott theory, it is one that ties all the creditors together. For one creditor to accept payment (or for an intermediary such as Euroclear to assist in such payment) without the other creditor getting paid proportionally would arguably be an interference with the other creditor's contract rights; thereby giving unpaid creditors potential suits against each other (and intermediaries about to issue payments). Important for purposes of the discussion that follows is that the clause at issue in the Peruvian case had that additional "payment" language modifying the "rank" concept.
Although the Elliott v. Peru was an important case and caused a great deal of drama in international financial policy circles, many in the industry also saw it as an aberration. That, we know now, was wishful thinking. The logic went something like this: "That decision was by an obscure commercial court in Brussels that probably does not even know what a sovereign bond is. No English or New York 7 court (and most foreign issued sovereign bonds today are governed by the laws of one of those two jurisdictions) would ever rule in that fashion." 10 For about a decade that did look to be the case. Various hedge funds tried to reproduce Elliott's strategy against Peru. But they mostly failed, even though there was never any explicit ruling contradicting their articulation of the pari passu clause.
Argentina was the biggest target, having performed the biggest sovereign default in history (until then) in late 2001 and then steadfastly refused to pay those creditors who didn't restructure their debts for the deep discounts that Argentina was willing to offer. For a decade, that Argentine litigation seemed to be going nowhere and even the pari passu argument seemed unlikely to work because when it was raised in the early years of the default, in 2004, the US government and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York stepped in to indicate their displeasure and the creditors quickly withdrew that argument. 11 In November of 2012, everything changed. In December 2011, Elliott had succeeded in getting the trial judge, Thomas Griesa, to rule in favor of them on the pari passu matter; essentially, along the lines of the Brussels court (with a few wrinkles that we will not go into here). 12 The trial judge's ruling was immediately appealed to the Second Circuit. The assumption of many, if not most, commentators was that the Second Circuit would reverse the trial judge. 13 However, the Second Circuit Court -historically, the most eminent legal body in the United States when it comes to commercial matters -essentially decided that the clause meant what Elliott said it did (Elliott, in this Argentine case, appeared in a new incarnation, NML Capital). 14 10 These views are described in Scott & Gulati, supra note 3; see also Burn, supra note 5 (expressing the view that no English court would follow the pari passu interpretation given by the Second Circuit in the NML v. Argentina litigation). 11 See Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Damage Control, Peterson Institute for International Economics Brief, PB13-12 at p.5 (May 2013). 12 See Gelpern, supra note 11 at 1 (discussing the evolution of the litigation). 13 Id. at 5 (discussing the widespread view regarding a likely reversal of Judge Griesa's December 2011 decision). 14 NML Capital v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012).
Although we still have a bit of the litigation story to tell, part of the reason Elliott won, we suspect, from hearing the questions of the judges, is that it showed up to court with a stronger and clearer argument about what the clause meant. To our reading, it seemed to say that the clause means that if you, the debtor, agree to a pari passu clause (and particularly one with the "payment" language in it) with your creditors, you cannot then later, make preferential payments to some creditors and stiff others. If you want to be able to do that, then don't agree to the pari passu clause. Argentina, by contrast, did not have a particularly strong explanation for what the clause was doing in modern contracts. Although it asserted that it had a clear understanding of clause in the litigation, the Second Circuit was able to easily discern that Argentina's asserted meaning for the clause, one that purportedly drew on industry custom, was far from well accepted and understood in the market. 15 Argentina's strongest argument was to say that no sensible sovereign debtor would agree to a clause that meant what Elliott/NML was asserting it meant (that creditors who have the protection of a pari passu clause have to be paid proportional shares of their claims when a sovereign debtor is unable to pay all their full amount). After all, sovereign debtors in crisis would not be able to pay key creditors, such as the IMF who provides emergency financing in times of crisis in exchange for priority in payments. Argentina's argument found little sympathy with the Second Circuit judges. And perhaps not surprisingly. Courts generally want to be able to assume that contract provisions are drafted by lawyers because they mean something.
In giving Elliott/NML its victory on the pari passu clause interpretation though, the court made clear that it held the drafting lawyers and Argentina responsible for the mess they were in. The Argentine clause had the word "payment" in the second sentence of its pari passu clause and Argentina had also passed something called the Lock Law. 16 If parties wanted to avoid this kind of litigation, the court seemed to be saying, at least implicitly, they should simply avoid 15 699 F.3d at 258. 16 699 F.3d at 259. using this payment language in their bonds and not pass laws of the type that Argentina had. 17 Much derision was then heaped upon the Second Circuit's decision by lawyers in the industry, much of it targeting the court's interpretation of the clause.
The argument, once again, was that the interpretation saying that the sovereign in default had to pay all its creditors proportionally under a pari passu clause was ludicrous. No sovereign in its right mind would ever agree to such a clause. 18 Economic theory though tells us that a borrower can be made better off by agreeing to extremely harsh penalties in the event of a failure to perform. 19 Such penalties, if enforceable, can change the borrower's payoff in default and serve as a commitment mechanism to help the borrower fulfill its contract. By agreeing to draconian penalties in the event of default a borrower can credibly signal their intent to perform and lower the interest rate that the borrower must pay. One might ask, therefore, whether the pari passu clause is an example of such a bargain.
As of this writing, the Second Circuit's decision is being appealed to the U.S. 
II. The Path to the Black Eagle and Equal Treatment a. Mexico during the First Republics: A Remarkably Recalcitrant Sovereign
The newly independent nation of Mexico successfully listed its first sovereign bond on the London Stock Exchange in 1824. With a war ravaged economy and lack of diplomatic recognition, Mexico was a risky credit, a fact reflected in the 9.14% yield-to-maturity it had to pay for the 1824 loan. 21 The loan was well received by the stock market, however, and began trading on the LSE at 69% of par, a considerable premium above its IPO price of 58, and reached a high of 83 by February 1825. 22 Buoyed by the success of its 1824 issue and formal diplomatic recognition by the United Kingdom, Mexico returned to the London market with another bond offering in 1825. The 1825 loan had essentially identical terms to the 1824 loan 23 and was issued with a yield of 6.81%, similar to the yield on United
States debt trading in London at the time. 24 The market's enthusiasm proved misplaced. Mexico defaulted on both issues in October 1827 and over the next sixty-one years bondholders were forced to agree to six restructuring attempts before a final resolution in 1888. 25 With each attempted restructuring bondholders accepted haircuts in face value or interest in exchange for promises that this time the Mexican government would pay, only to be 21 For the terms of the loan, see MICHAEL P. COSTELOE, BONDS AND BONDHOLDERS: BRITISH INVESTORS AND MEXICO'S FOREIGN DEBT 1824-1888, 12-13 (2003). The 1824 loan had a par value of £3,200,000, paid a 5% quarterly coupon in Sterling and had a 30-year term with a sinking fund pledged to redeem £64,000 in year 1 and £32,000 plus accrued interest on cancelled bonds in years 2 through 30. The contract prevented the Mexican government from seeking further loans for twelve months and promised to redeem 25% of the 1824 loan with any proceeds from future loans. The Mexican government promised to deposit a mortgage bond with the Bank of England pledging the general revenues of the nation and hypothecating 1/3rd of the custom revenues collected at Gulf of Mexico ports as security. The Goldsmidt Banking Company underwrote the bond at an IPO price of 58% of par which corresponded to a yield-to-maturity of 9.14%. 22 Id. at 16 23 Costeloe, supra note 21, at 18-20, provides the terms of the 1825 loan. The 1825 loan had a par value of £3,200,000, paid a 6% quarterly coupon in Sterling and had a 30-year term with a sinking fund pledged to redeem £32,000 per year. The Mexican government promised to deposit a mortgage bond with the Bank of England pledging the general revenues of the nation and hypothecating a further 1/3 of all custom revenues as security. Michelena, Barclay & Co. underwrote the bond at an IPO price of 89.75% of par, which corresponded to a yield-to-maturity of 6.81%. 24 Authors' calculations from the London price of U.S. Treasury bonds available at http://eh.net/database/earlyu-s-securities-prices/ . Multiple U.S. Treasury bonds trading in London at the time with yields-to-maturity that ranged from 6.23% to 7.22%. 25 The disappointed. 26 As a result, Mexico found itself unable to list new bonds on the exchanges of the United States and Europe and was forced to rely instead on domestic borrowing to fund its budget deficits throughout the 1830s. 27 Much of what would later become known as the "internal debt" of Mexico took the form of short term borrowing, forced loans or mortgages against future revenue streams. Mexico mortgaged future custom revenues by issuing Certificados de Aduanas (certificates that paid interest and were accepted in payment of customs revenue) and forced holders of pre-independence internal debt, merchants, soldiers, pensioners and public employees to extend credit to the sovereign by paying salaries, interest on old internal debt and accounts receivable in pagares, vales de alcane, and vales de amortization (interest bearing promissory notes) which could often be used to purchase government land or pay custom taxes at fixed prices. 28 In addition to these short term instruments the Mexican government sold assets, farmed taxes, issued bonds backed by the future revenue of the state tobacco monopoly and acquired much needed specie by arranging short-term loans at ruinous rates from local banking houses. 29 Forced loans and custom certificates were only a temporary solution. Facing threats of internal rebellion and foreign invasion the central government maintained an expensive standing army which drained the treasury and resulted in fiscal deficits that rose from 9.6% of tax revenues in fiscal year1828/29 to 55% of 26 30 . In November 1834 the government "acknowledged its inability to repay its obligations to speculators and asserted its right to pay some in preference of others." 31 By 1836 the amount of outstanding paper debts accepted at the customs house exceeded expected future custom taxes by such an amount that the market price of Certificados de Aduanas fell to less than 20% of face value. 32 Much of this discounted debt was then acquired by Elliott/NML-type distressed debt investors of the day; investment banking houses with the resources and political clout to attempt to collect through either legal action or through the imposition of political pressure via foreign governments.
The Mexican government's next solution to its exploding internal debt was to pass a law on 20 January 1836, which mandated that holders of the custom house certificates convert their certificates into bonds backed by a new fund pledging 15% of the nation's custom house revenues. With this decree, holders of the various internal debts could no longer pay their customs taxes by presenting their debt instruments at the Mexican customs houses. Instead they had to convert their certificates into the new bonds of the "15 percent fund" which paid dividends and amortized principal in specie from the 15 percent of custom revenues set aside to service the debt. Although this was effectively a default on the terms of the custom certificates (in the aggregate they were now worth only 15% of customs revenues rather than 100%) the resulting increase in custom collections meant that speculators that acquired Certificados de Aduanas at steep discounts before 1836 profited handsomely from the restructuring. 33 30 Calculations made from Table 8 in Tenenbaum, supra note 28, at 52. 31 Id. at 58. 32 Walker, who examined the archives of one prominent investment bank that specialized in speculation in Mexico's internal debt estimates that most of the internal debt certificates converted into the 15% fund of 1836 were purchased in the open market for less than 20% of par value. See Walker, supra note 29 at 166. 33 Id. at 166. with a 0% coupon and an $800,000 senior tranche that paid a 0-4% monthly dividend from 17% of the custom revenues collected at the port of Veracruz. 34 The 17 percent fund bonds traded at 50% of face value in 1838 but rose to 65% by January 1839 and 75% by August 1840 and made, according to one envious account, "a beautiful profit" for the investment houses that purchased the deeply discounted government paper that was eventually exchanged for the 17 percent bonds. 35 More conversions backed by customs hypothecations soon followed, an 8 per Martinez del Rio Hermanos partner with English citizenship used his standing as a 39 Id. 40 The Tobacco bond speculation is described in Chapter 8 of Walker, supra note 29. 41 See Flandreau, supra note 27 (describing the majority requirement for restructurings on the London exchange in the 1800s). . 45 The price of 12% of par can be found in a letter between the managing partners of the del Rio bank. Walker, supra note 29 at 167; cf. ROBERT WYLLIE, MEXICO: REPORT ON ITS FINANCES UNDER THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT, SINCE ITS INDEPENDENCE 38 (1844) (reporting that the paper was trading at 14%). The contract terms and the claim that these were the cheapest to deliver bonds in the market can be found in MANUEL PAYNO, MEXICO AND 
c. Santa Anna and his Equal Treatment Decree
The historical record tells us that there was good reason for the Mexican government, circa 1843, to want to assure foreign creditors that they would be treated in an equal and fair manner. This was, after all, the era of gunboat diplomacy. From its independence Mexico had sought to use foreign loans as a means to encourage British protection. 49 In 1838, only five years prior to the issuance of the Black Eagle and its equal treatment decree, France had blockaded the Mexican coast and attacked its ports to collect on a debt of 600,000 pesos owed its citizens and assure that the Mexican government was to "pledge itself not to throw any obstacles against the rights of the holders of the loan known by the name of 17 per cent loan". 50 Indeed, General Santa Anna (of the Alamo fame), had lost a leg to the French marines in that bombardment. Nothing, we suspect, focuses a debtor's mind on creditor rights like the loss of a limb in a naval bombardment.
Moreover, Mexico probably remembered that British bondholders, who had been The more powerful native creditors began to make separate deals for themselves. They could bargain efficiently with Santa Anna; family connections, political promises, and appropriate gifts brought favorable resolutions from politicians at the highest levels. The cooperation of the career civil servants who managed routine government affairs was secured through other arrangements. By law, appointees to posts involving fiscal responsibilities had to have afiador guarantee their good behavior in office. Empresarios like the Rubios, the Escandóns, and the Fagoagas put upfianzas (bonds) for dozens of officials, ranging from the head of the customs house in Tampico to the tax administrator of Tlalpam. In contrast to the proven Mexican model, foreign merchants like the Martinez del Rios failed to develop useful relations with either the politicians or the bureaucrats, trusting instead that their legations would look after their interests.
Santa Anna announced in July 1842 that payments to the funds would be resumed under certain conditions. The combined 8 Percent, 10 Percent, 15 Percent, and 17 Percent funds might receive 15 percent of customs duties if each agreed to pay a $40,000 refaccion. Because the new quota would not provide enough revenue even to pay interest on the principal owed, the creditors listened to the proposal without enthusiasm. Many of them were shocked to learn three days later of a new decree that lifted the suspension of payments to the 15 Percent Fund. Only after this fund had been paid in full, were the other funds to receive payments from that quota, according to the order of their seniority. The special deal for the 15 Percent Fund was the work of Ignacio Loperena and Antonio Garay, agiotistas who had intimate associations with Santa Anna and had invested heavily in that fund. 56 55 Walker, supra note 29 at 177 & n.21. 56 Id. at 177. In a follow-up letter dated Oct. 14, 1843 the Mexican ambassador to the United Kingdom noted that the holdouts stood to make huge profits from their purchase of defaulted bonds "at a low price on the spot from the poor widow and starving invalid" and had suffered no more than other creditors. 72 The Mexicans argued that since the May 11 th decree offered "to all creditors" the same exchange into Black Eagle bonds, British subjects did not suffer unfair treatment and the British government should agree with the Mexican view that the bonds "proper and natural character, to wit, that of a private contract between individuals and a government" and should not warrant British intervention. 73 The British Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Aberdeen, responded with a letter dated Nov.1, 1843 that (before closing with the threat that he desired their countries to remain on "pacific" 70 Letter #123 p. 94-99 , in Correspondence, supra note 57. 71 Letter #116 p. 87-89 , in Correspondence, supra note 57. 72 Letter #123 p. 94-99 , in Correspondence, supra note 57. 73 Letter #123 p. 94-99 , in Correspondence, supra note 57. terms) disagreed with the notion that the United Kingdom should not intervene because the British holdout bondholders were treated equally by the May 11 th exchange offer. 74
III. What Does This Mean Today?
As promised at the outset, we are not going to opine as to what our findings mean for the contemporary interpretation of the standard pari passu clause.
Instead, we note four observations that can hopefully be useful starting points for a discussion of the relevance of the history to the interpretation of the modern pari passu clause. The hard work of connecting the historical story to the contemporary interpretation, however, is one we leave to the real experts.
a. When Did the Concept Originate?
Most contemporary commentators (including one of us in prior work) locate the origins of the pari passu concept in the issuance of sovereign bonds secured by pledges of revenues in roughly the period ranging between 1870-1930. 75 Further, when it comes to the use of the "payment" language to modify the rank concept, commentators seem to believe that that crept in long after the "rank" concept was well established (perhaps as late as the1980s). The language from Santa Anna's decree that is reproduced on the Black Eagle suggests that the pari passu concept, in its payment incarnation, originated at least four decades prior to what the literature suggests.
b. Where did the Concept Originate?
As noted earlier, there are a variety of stories that are told regarding the origins of pari passu, including ones about gunboats, earmarks and domestics laws 74 Letter #124 p. 99-103 , in Correspondence, supra note 57. 75 For an articulation of the various views, see Weidemaier et al., supra note 4 at 77-81. (Although the key language of the decree is then reproduced prominently in the bond.) Why did Santa Anna promise equal treatment via a decree rather than in the contract provisions? Was that because he thought that his promise would be stronger if it was made via a decree or was it because it was weaker? We do not know. It still remains the case though that the first time we see the pari passu concept show up in a contract provision in a sovereign bond is in 1872 for Bolivia.
d. Translating a Concept From an Era Without Legal Enforcement
If one concludes (a) that the pari passu concept is indeed one that has existed for centuries in sovereign bonds and (b) that this history might be able to illuminate how we understand the clause, there is still one large leap that needs to be made.
That is that the origins of the clause seem to lie in a period when there was no real possibility of legal enforcement. The clause had value, we suspect, because its violation provided a justification for the gunboats to be sent in. Today, there are no gunboats that will enforce debt contracts, but there are courts that will at least try.
Question is: How does this old clause, devised for an entirely different era, get translated into the modern era.
